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A. Introduction  
 
1. Objective. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the pros and cons of 
establishing a system of indexed bonds as a means of assisting employers in 
the event that governments (federal and/or provincial) should require them 
to adjust pension payments under their pension plans to compensate   
for inflation. Cl)  The main body of this appendix  is divided  into three   
parts. This introduction describes briefly the mechanics of indexed 
bonds, the way that inflation may affect the cost of indexed pensions 
and, hence, the reasons why indexed bonds are being considered as a 
means of offsetting such inflationary impacts. It also notes the role 
of pension fund money in the financial system in Canada. The second 
part appraises the possible impact of indexed bonds on the economy 
generally, on financial markets, and on government operations. It 
also briefly reviews experience abroad with indexed bonds. The third 
part deals with the conclusions arrived at from the foregoing 
discussion. In addition, there are two annexes. One of these provides 
an estimate of the possible demand for, and supply of, indexed bonds. 
The other comments on the risk that with indexed bonds, public debt 
servicing costs might become less predictable. 
 
2. The Mechanics of Indexed Bonds. The indexing of securities involves 
the periodic adjustment over time of interest and/or principal payments 
on those securities in line with recorded changes in some predetermined 
standard - the 'index'. The choice of the index and the precise method 
of linkage to changes in principal or interest is a function of the 
ingenuity of borrowers and of their perception of the potential demand 
in the market for specific indexing arrangements. 
 
The following discussion focuses only on two simple types of 
indexed bonds: 1) the 'principal compensation' bond and, 2) the 'indexed 
principal' bond. In the case of the former, compensation is paid at the 
end of each year for the decline in the real value of the bond's nominal 
value during that year. At maturity, therefore, only the original 
 
* Mr. Rost van Tonningen was a consultant to the Task Force on Retirement 
Income Policy. Mr. Sargent, Mr. Grady and Mr. Miller are Department  
of Finance  officers.  
(l)It should be pointed out that this appendix does not explore the 
equity issues raised by the indexed bond approach. While indexed 
bonds are examined here solely as a technique to facilitate indexed 
pensions, the equity question would undoubtedly merit attention 
should serious consideration be given to adopting this approach. 
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nominal value of the bond, adjusted for the inflationary experience 
of the last year, would need to be repaid, since the lender would 
already have been compensated for the loss in the real value of his 
original investment during each of the previous years. The indexed 
principal bond, on the other hand; provides for repayment of 
principal in real terms only upon maturity. In that case, full 
compensation for the loss in real value of the principal amount of 
the bond is paid when the bond matures. 
 
In both cases, a specific 'real' rate of interest would also 
be paid annually. Mechanically, the real value interest stream can be 
calculated by applying the specified real rate of interest on the bond 
(i.e. 2%) to the indexed value of the bond's principal at the end of 
each interest period. Table 1 illustrates how the alternative systems 
would work based on two five-year indexed bonds, one of the principal 
compensation variety and the other of an indexed principal type, each 
carrying a 2% 'real value' coupon. This illustration further assumes 
that, during the five-year life of these bonds, the annual inflation  
experience was as follows: 3%, 5%, 6%, 4%, 2%. This would have 
produced the following stream of payments with respect to 
interest, inflation compensation, and principal. 
 
Table 1 
 
Debt Servicing Schedules for Principal Compensation 
and Indexed Principal Bonds 
  Principal Compensation Indexed Principal  
 
Year 
 Compen - Prin-  Compen- Prin-  
 
Interest sation cipal Other Interest sation cipal Other 
 
I (3%) 2.06 3.00  2.06    
 
Il (5%) 2.10 5.00  2.16    
 
III (6%) 2.12 6.00  2.29    
 
IV (4%) 2.08 4.00  2.38 
21.61 100.00 
 
 
V (2%) 2.04 2.00 100.0 2.43  
  
Interest earned on all payments  
1.31 
 
made during years I to IV 3.84 
 
Value at maturity  of stream   
 
of principal and/or interest   
 
payments  to the lender, assuming   
 
reinvestment of all payments   
 
received at prevailing interest  
134.24 
 
rates   134.24 
 
 
 
As noted above, the real value interest rate concept requires 
that interest payments be calculated on the basis of the indexed value 
of the bond's principal at the end of each year. This is quite simple 
in the case of the principal compensation bond, where the principal 
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value series for the purpose of calculating interest payments 
is as follows: $103, $105, $106, $104 and $102, and where 2% of 
$103, for instance, is $2.06. In the case of the indexed 
principal bond, however, where no inflation compensation 
payments are made until maturity, a compounding element occurs 
in the principal base used for calculating interest payments. 
Interest payments are, therefore, based on the following 
series: $103, '$108.15, $114.64, $119.22, $121.61. The $108.15 
principal base for year 11, in this case, is derived by 
multiplying the $103 principal value at the end of year I by 
1.05 (which reflects the second year's rate of inflation). 
 
3. The Impact of Inflation on Pensions.   Generally  speaking,  as shown  
in the Task Force report, inflation causes fluctuations and uncertainties in 
the cost of defined benefit pension plans even in the case of those that are 
not indexed. The extent to which cost fluctuations occur in individual plans 
varies widely at any given level of inflation and depends on a number of 
~actors. These include the economic assumptions used, the method of 
valuation of assets and liabilities, the extent to which a plan may already 
have been underfunded, the provisions for amortization of unfunded 
liabilities and the type of plan concerned. Moreover, it appears that the 
more a defined benefit plan is indexed  
for inflation, the greater the range of cost fluctuations it is 
likely to experience. By definition, however, there is no impact 
on money purchase or other defined contribution plans because 
liabilities in such plans are simply a function of contribution 
levels and of realized rates of return. 
 
Employers would feel more confident with respect to the cost 
of their pension plans if the rate of return on their pension fund 
assets were always to reflect the current inflationary experience. 
Ideally, therefore, many employers would like access to an investment 
instrument with a yield which would adjust fully and immediately to 
changing rates of inflation. Unfortunately, the present financial 
system offers no such instrument. The market value of long-term bonds  
fluctuates inversely with interest rates. In periods of rising inflation, 
therefore, the market value of outstanding long-term bonds may be eroded 
both in nominal and real terms. Equities produce unstable rates of return 
and are no longer considered to provide an adequate short- and medium-
term hedge against inflation. Residential mortgages offer more scope for 
yield adjustment since the periodic renewal clause has come into general 
use, but still may lag well behind changes in inflation 
rates and consequent changes in rates of interest. Short-term debt 
securities and money market instruments usually provide greater scope 
for yield adjustment, however, because their frequent rollovers do 
enable investors to reinvest the proceeds of maturing securities into 
others. There is no certainty, of course, about the real yield that 
will be earned on the proceeds that are reinvested. Indexed bonds, 
however, could further increase the ability of employers to invest in 
securities providing a rate of return which kept pace with inflation. 
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4. Indexed Securities and the Significance of Real Rates of Return. Under 
existing non-indexed pension plans providing benefits based on career average 
earnings - the relative importance of which has been declining - there may be a 
tendency to seek to maximize nominal rates of return because, ill other things 
being equal, higher than anticipated money income on pension fund assets reduces 
the need for employer pension contributions. Those pension plans providing 
benefits based on so-called final average earnings, which have been gaining in 
importance are, of course, already effectively indexed until retirement. Nominal 
returns are, therefore, of lesser concern (and real returns of greater concern) 
for such plans. With full indexing, however, real, rather than nominal, rates of 
return would become the overriding concern for all plans because all liabilities 
(pre- and post-retirement) would be indexed. (Basically, the real rate would 
'finance' the accumulation of assets necessary to produce a given level of real 
downstream pension benefits, while the 'inflationary premium' part of the 
nominal rate of return could be deemed to be funding the current dollar value of 
that level of downstream benefits.) 
 
5. The Significance of Employer-Sponsored Pension Funds in Financial Markets. 
It may be useful to note briefly the significance of the flow of savings 
associated with employer-sponsored pension plans, and of the already existing 
stock of such savings, within the overall Canadian financial framework. If 
employer-sponsored pensions (particularly those in the private sector) were to 
be indexed, and indexed bonds made available to facilitate the indexing of 
those pensions, questions would arise as to what the demand for such bonds 
might be and what portion of Canadian financial markets and financial assets 
might become indexed for inflation. An examination of the total volume of 
assets involved,  
and of their current deployment as between various types of instruments, constitutes 
a necessary step towards determining the demand for indexed bonds and their possible 
effect on financial markets. While for a number of reasons the volume of pension 
fund assets will likely always be less than the volume of pension liabilities, the 
asset figure will nevertheless be useful in developing a first approximation of 
demand. 
 
Table 2 sets out the distribution of assets accumulated in various 
private forms to 'fund' retirement incomes such as trusteed pension plans, the 
annuities and segregated funds activities of insurance companies, and Registered 
Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs). These numbers specifically exclude the Canada 
and Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP), Old Age Security (OAS) and Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS), the public sector superannuation programs, and Government of 
Canada annuities. They do, however, include all public sector 'trusteed' plans. 
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Table 2 
 
Estimated Assets of Trusteed Pension Plans,  
Other Employer-Sponsored  Plans, and RRSPs,  1976 
 
      Mortgages  and  
 
   Total   Guaranteed  Annual 
 
   Assets Bonds Stocks Funds (1) Misc.(2) Flow 
 
     ($  billions)   
 
Trusteed pension      
 
funds  25.2 12.2 5.8 4.3 2.9 3.7 
 
Insurance Cos.  
1.7 
 
1.9 
  
 
a) annuities 4.6 0.3 0.7 0.4 
 
b) segregated funds 2 ~2 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.4 
 
RRSPs  7.5 1.3 1.1 4.5 0.6 1.7 
 
Total  39.5 15.8 8.0 11.3 4.4 6.2 
  
(l)Includes investment certificates, term deposits, etc., the 
proceeds of which are largely used by issuers to finance the 
acquisition of mortgages.  
(2)Includes cash balances, money market instruments, real 
estate and foreign securities. 
 
By comparison, the asset components of the total 
Canadian financial market are illustrated in Table 3. 
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Table  3 
 
Relative  Importance  of Various  Types  of Assets  in  
Canadian  Financial  Markets,  1973-1976 
 
End of Year Level  Annual Flow  
 
 1976 1973 1974 1975 1976 
 
  ($ billions)   
 
Treasury  Bills  & 
17.1 1.2 3.7 1.2 2.5 
 
Short-Term  Paper 
 
Mortgages 81.5 7.9 8.3 8.6 12.4 
 
Bonds(l) 111.7 3.9 7.8 12.2 15.9 
 
Stocks 117.7 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.9 
 
Total 328.0 14.4 21.1 23.8 31. 7 
  
(l)Net of Canada  Savings  Bonds. 
Source: 
1.
 Financial  Flow Accounts  as taken  from CANSIM,  June  1, 1978. 
2. Statistics  Canada,  13-002,  Financial  Flow Accounts.   
3. Statistics  Canada,  13-563,  Financial  Flow Accounts.  
 
The importance of these private retirement financing arrange-
ments relative to the Canadian financial structure taken as a whole can 
be gauged from comparisons of the 1976 cash flow of these private 
retirement income funds, at $6.2 billion, with overall savings flows of 
$31.7 billion in 1976 (amounting to 20%), and of the 1976 figure for 
retirement-related assets of $39.5 billion with the total asset figure 
of $328 billion (representing 12%). It can be further illustrated by 
the fact that the annual net cash flows of trusteed pension funds alone  
during the decade to December 31, 1974, in all but one year were 
equivalent to 22-26% of the total net new supply of Canada long-term 
financial instruments. 
 
It is difficult to be specific about the offsetting liabilities of 
retirement income funds. By definition, total liabilities with respect to 
RRSPs and money purchase plans are identical to their assets.  
Insured plans also have few or no unfunded liabilities. As for segregated 
funds of insurance companies, no data are available. With regard to 
trusteed pension fund liabilities, however, a 1975 survey by the Ontario 
Pension Commission of a substantial sample of plans indicated that 68%  
of the plans  surveyed,  covering  84% of the surveyed  plan membership,  
were under-funded by an average 32%. Most of this under-funding reflected 
'initial prior service credits', retroactive amendments and updating, 
experience deficiencies arising from unexpectedly high salary increases  
in the case of final average pay plans, updated benefits in the case of 
flat benefit plans, and adjustments to pensions-in-pay generally. 
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Normally, smaller employers with less favourable pension plans tend to 
be more fully funded. These results do not appear out of line with the 
United States experience, insofar as the latter can be determined from 
information provided in new issue prospectuses filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and, from material published elsewhere. 
 
Little is known about the disbursement patterns of pension plans 
involving the insurance companies and about the liquidation rates of 
RRSPs. With regard to trusteed pension funds, however, a reported net 
cash flow of $3.7 billion in 1976 reflected total contributions of $3.4 
billion, plus $1.7 billion of investment income, less $1.1 billion in 
pensions paid out or purchased, and less a further $0.3 billion in  
other miscellaneous  expenses - including cash withdrawals by beneficiaries. 
 
In summary, private retirement arrangements constitute a signi-
ficant portion of net new savings flows and of the total stock of financial 
assets in Canada. The future growth in private retirement-related  
assets could continue to outstrip the overall rate of asset growth as a 
result of a number of possible factors. These include a reduction in 
existing unamortized liabilities, an increase in the popularity of 
RRSPs as the average age of the population rises, and the possible 
increase in the future in the assets of private retirement funds. 
Still, there are offsetting factors and it is difficult to be certain. 
 
B. Analysis  
 
1. Choice of Scenarios.  If the federal government were to urge - or   
require - private employers to index their pension plans, it may well be 
argued that such a policy stance would have to be augmented by some 
initiative on the part of the government to reduce the volatility and 
uncertainty of employer pension costs. The introduction of indexed 
federal bonds might constitute such an initiative. One question that 
arises, however, is whether a sufficient quantity of indexed bonds 
could, as a practical matter, be made available to meet the requirements  
of pension plans  (including those administered by life insurance companies). 
 
To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the 
framework within which indexed bonds might be introduced. The analysis 
below assumes that the federal government would take the initiative  
in issuing indexed bonds. (2)  Three scenarios are considered: 
 
Scenario 1: Government of Canada indexed bonds are available in 
unlimited quantities, but only to eligible purchasers in 
respect of pension and retirement saving programs. (3) 
 
(2)A report prepared for the Economic Council by James Pesando 
argues that, for reasons of cost, private companies are 
unlikely to take the lead in offering indexed bonds.  
(3)While it may be that the federal government in this case 
could limit acquisition of its own indexed bonds to 'eligible 
purchasers' only, (i.e. to retirement income plans) other 
issuers of indexed bonds might not impose such restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, 
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Scenario 2: The volume of Government of Canada indexed bonds is 
limited, but there are no restrictions on who may 
purchase them. 
 
Scenario 3: The volume of Government of Canada indexed bonds is 
limited and they are available only to eligible 
purchasers for pension-related purposes. 
 
A fourth scenario, where Government of Canada indexed bonds 
would be available in unlimited quantities to all willing buyers, was 
examined, but discarded as being impractical. If the demand for, and 
the supply of, indexed federal bonds were open-ended, the federal 
government at some point would likely have to assume the role of a 
major financial intermediary, since the level of indexed bonds it would 
be expected to issue would, at times at least, be in excess of its own 
financing needs. (This is what happened in Brazil in 1974.) 
 
Under Scenarios 2 and 3, where there is a limit on the quantity 
of federal indexed bonds issued, the question arises as to how the 
federal government would establish and allocate the available supply. 
One way of determining the total amount of new indexed bonds to be made 
available would be to limit it to a fraction of the total of net new 
cash requirements and rollovers of maturing bond issues, without any 
commitment to hold this ratio fixed over time. The total supply to be 
made available and its allocation might be determined simultaneously by 
offering new indexed bonds to prospective purchasers based on the 
historical pattern of their acquisition of assets. The latter would have 
the advantage of facilitating the forecasting by the government of the 
future demand for indexed bonds, and of helping to prevent sudden 
fluctuations in demand as economic conditions changed. 
 
An alternative means of determining the distribution of a given 
volume of new indexed bonds, however arrived at, would be to allocate the 
total by auction based on bid prices. In any case, it might well be 
desirable to build into any allocation system a preference for small- and 
medium-size pension funds, while retaining the price mechanism as the basic 
determinant of who would get the bonds. 
 
2. The Supply of and Demand for Indexed Bonds. To develop even a 
rough sense of what the demand might be for indexed bonds under each 
of these three scenarios necessarily involves considerable 
guesswork. A major uncertainty concerns the real interest return 
that should be established on an indexed bond. If the real return is 
significantly higher than many lenders believe they will likely be 
able to earn from conventional securities, after discounting the 
nominal rate of interest offered by the anticipated rate of future 
inflation, the resulting heavy demand for indexed bonds could have a 
disruptive effect on financial markets. In the reverse situation, 
however, the demand .for indexed bonds may be minimal, with the 
result that they will fail to achieve their stated objective. (4) 
 
(4)To the.extent that a viable secondary market develops for indexed 
federal bonds, the chances of this happening would be reduced. 
9 
 
Other questions relate to the number of buyers who 
would be willing to pay something extra to obtain an indexed 
bond in a period of more than normal uncertainty about future 
inflation, and to the number of buyers (e.g. some small 
pension funds) who would be willing to do so at all times, 
regardless of inflationary circumstances. For instance, it is 
not inconceivable that some buyers who would not normally 
accept less than an anticipated 2% real return annually on 
ordinary money bonds might, in fact, accept, less than a 2% real 
return annually if that return were assured. Unfortunately, it 
is by no means clear how the certainty of real returns would 
be valued by various classes of buyers. 
 
Thus, the demand for a given volume of indexed bonds at any 
point in time would be influenced heavily by the real rate of 
return that is guaranteed, and by the way that real rate compares 
to the anticipated real rate on money bonds in light of 
inflationary expectations. On the assumption that the real rate and 
the price would be appropriate to market circumstances, a very 
crude approximation of demand and supply can be developed.(5) 
 
In Scenarios 1 and 3, eligible holders of indexed federal 
bonds are limited to institutions administering pension and 
retirement saving programs - namely, trusteed pension funds, 
insurance companies with respect to their annuity and segregated 
fund operations, and all financial intermediaries with respect to 
RRSPs. The total asset base and the annual cash flow of these 
sectors of the financial markets was approximately $39.5 billion 
and $6.2 billion respectively in 1976. These numbers set the outer 
limit for the potential demand for indexed bonds in that year. In 
practice, however, total demand would have been a good deal 
smaller for the following reasons: a) pension fund managers would 
be unlikely to commit themselves unreservedly to such a new 
instrument; b) a continuing desire to achieve the perceived 
benefits of investment diversification; c) institutional inertia, 
as some investment managers would resist any wholesale move into 
indexed securities for reasons of their own survival (although in 
most cases they could be overruled by the plans' sponsors); and d) 
any widespread liquidation of non-indexed assets to purchase 
indexed bonds could cause an erosion in the market value of the 
former which would increase the cost of making such a switch to 
the point of being prohibitive. 
 
(5)An attempt has been made in Annex A to quantify the potential 
demand for, and supply of, indexed bonds. In the absence of any 
price structure within which the supply and demand situation 
might evolve, its findings are, of course, tentative in the 
extreme. 
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The analysis in Annex A suggests that potential_ demand under 
Scenario 1 might be in the $5 billion range annually for a period of 
several years, with great uncertainty as to whether the demand might 
subsequently drop, remain constant, or rise. The factors that bear on 
demand are so numerous, and so contradictory, that it is difficult to 
make any judgment as to what the outcome would be. 
 
Under Scenario 3, although potential demand would be similar 
to Scenario 1, the limited supply under some allocation procedures 
could result in a lower real return as compared to Scenario 1 and, 
hence, serve to cut down the total effective demand. Under Scenario 2, 
assuming the same supply of indexed bonds as in Scenario 3, the real  
return required to place those bonds could be even lower than in 
Scenario 1, since potential demand would be greater at all price levels. 
 
On the supply side, Scenario 1 guarantees that the supply will 
meet the demand at the real rate of return chosen. Scenarios 2 and 3 
are based on a limited supply, and the inference is that there are 
other government objectives that must be considered, and that these  
necessarily constrain the potential supply. Some of these other objectives 
are discussed below. Here it is sufficient to note that the analysis 
in Annex A suggests that perhaps $3 billion annually might be 
made available in indexed bonds by federal and provincial 
governments in the several years ahead if this approach were 
adopted. This would be about two-thirds of the estimated 
potential demand. On a longer term basis, however, the potential 
supply from governments would likely drop to half the potential 
demand, or less, as government cash requirements declined. 
 
As noted previously, there would be nothing to prevent the 
federal government from limiting the sale of its indexed bonds to 
institutions financing indexed pensions. However, the federal government 
would not be able to impose the same constraints on other issuers. It 
would be up to the latter to decide for themselves if the sale of their 
indexed bonds would be limited in this, or any other, way. 
 
What about sources of supply for indexed bonds other than the 
federal and provincial governments? Municipalities have a revenue base which 
is less elastic relative to inflation than the federal or provincial 
governments. Hence, they would likely feel less able to issue indexed bonds 
than the provinces. In any event, pension funds are at present a less 
significant source of financing for municipalities than for the provinces 
and, accordingly, municipalities may feel less compelled to offer indexed 
bonds to protect an established financing source. 
 
It is also doubtful that, in the first instance at least, the 
corporate sector would be a major source of indexed bonds. For one 
thing, corporations that issue indexed bonds would face substantial 
uncertainties. For instance, even if initial debt servicing costs were 
lower for indexed bonds than for money bonds, the differential might 
not be considered sufficient to offset the apparently open-ended nature 
of the borrower's debt servicing liability during the life of the 
issue. Secondly, to the extent that indexed bonds would be a new and 
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untried instrument, they might well involve the borrower in additional 
marketing and advertising costs, which would further reduce the advantage 
in initial borrowing costs that indexed bonds might have over money 
bonds. Finally, assuming that indexed bonds would be geared to some 
general index, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI), future debt 
servicing costs need not conform with the specific future cost and profit 
patterns of individual borrowers. Even if the proceeds of an indexed 
issue were invested in generally 'inflation-proof' assets such as real 
estate, the fact that the value of these assets might keep pace with 
inflation over the long haul would not eliminate corporate concern about 
its ability to meet current debt servicing costs during the  
short and medium  term. 
 
On the other hand, it should be noted that some corporations 
are already accepting what is clearly equivalent to the servicing costs 
of 'indexed debt'. Some large corporations, for example, depend on 
'short-term 'commercial paper' as a source of financing. Others use 
revolving lines of bank credit. Still others in recent years have 
obtained term financing from banks on a 'prime rate plus' basis. In 
each of these instances, future debt servicing costs will fluctuate 
with the interest rate structure and will not be predictable with  
precision. To the extent that indexed bonds would replace such financing, 
corporate exposure to risk from unforeseen future debt service cost 
fluctuations would not be much different than it would be under existing 
circumstances. Still, a long-term indexed bond issue would commit the 
corporate borrower to more unpredictable debt servicing costs over  
longer periods of time. 
 
Furthermore, the degree of acceptance by corporations of 
indexed bonds as a financing instrument is likely to vary from one 
corporation to another. To the extent that corporations could readily 
'layoff' the risk of future debt service cost fluctuations onto someone 
else, their attitude towards indexed bonds would likely be less 
negative. Monopolies, or near monopolies - whose market power enabled 
them to pass on to their customers cost increases, including debt 
servicing costs - might have fewer reservations about indexed bonds 
than companies in more competitive environments. To the extent that 
firms in regulated industries could incorporate anticipated increases 
in future debt servicing costs into their expenditure base for the 
purpose of justifying rate increases, they might also be relatively 
less concerned about t6e fluctuating debt service cost aspects of 
indexed bonds. Finally, financial intermediaries which could match 
indexed liabilities with indexed assets could, all other things being  
equal, be expected to be in a favourable position to issue 
indexed bonds. (6) 
 
(6)In the final analysis, and in the context of the feasibility of 
indexing pensions, it may well be that the same considerations of 
market power and financial strength that would enable a corporation 
to consider issuing indexed bonds are also pre-requisites for the 
feasibility of the indexing of the corporate pension plan. That is, 
corporations that already offer a substantial measure of pension 
indexing would also be those most likely to issue indexed bonds. 
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In summary, because federal and provincial governments would 
appear unlikely to meet the initial demand for indexed bonds, and 
corporations would probably not be in the field at first, it appears 
almost inevitable that the supply of indexed federal and provincial 
bonds would need to be subject - at least at the outset - to some form  
of restraint, with the result that there would be some, perhaps substantial, 
unsatisfied demand. (7) These conclusions, it bears repeating, are based  
on very rough estimates only. Furthermore, governments might find 
themselves in future unable to issue as many indexed bonds as may be 
practical simply because of limits on their cash requirements. And 
while some corporations might have begun by then to issue such bonds, 
demand may also have risen. Therefore, with the passage of time, the 
allocation problem may remain difficult. There are, however, too many 
variables at this stage to speak with any certainty. 
 
3. The General Economic  Impact.  Indexed bonds may have an effect on  
the efficiency and stability of the economic system because they eliminate 
the transfers of real wealth between borrowers and lenders that occur  
with money bonds when the actual inflation rate differs from the anticipated 
rate. There is no consensus as to the nature or likely importance of  
these effects. Some advocate the use of indexed bonds as having potentially 
beneficial 'effects on the functioning of the economy; others see substantial 
dangers to the economy from the use of indexed financial instruments. 
 
This section provides a brief discussion of the effects that the 
existence of indexed bonds might have on saving, investment, economic 
stability, and investor psychology. Unfortunately, key links in the 
analysis are subject to considerable uncertainty. One uncertainty 
concerns the role that indexed assets would come to play in financial 
markets and, in particular, the extent to which they would be issued by 
borrowers other than the federal government. The financial market  
might adjust readily to a limited issue of indexed federal bonds (and 
to offsetting reductions in the issue of other types of securities 
 
(7)Even with unsatisfied demand, there is a risk with Scenarios 1 or 3 
that the issue price of indexed bonds would be below the price that 
would prevail if there were no restrictions on buyers. If the price 
paid by pension funds were lower than it would be in the ,absence of 
restrictions, this would imply a subsidy to them. This could occur 
if market expectations about inflation exceeded the government's 
inflationary expectations. In that case, the market would bid up the 
price of the indexed bond, thus implying that the real interest 
coupon on the indexed bond was higher than it need have been. 
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by the federal government) through some switching in financial flows. 
If this were to occur, the use of indexed assets in the capital markets 
might remain modest. This is most likely in Scenario 3 and, under  
these circumstances, any general economic effect would be quite limited. 
Alternatively, if the federal government were to issue substantial 
quantities of indexed bonds and not restrict their holding (Scenario 2), 
or if it were to issue unlimited quantities to pension funds and  
life insurance companies in respect of their pension and annuity 
liabilities (Scenario 1), there might well be a general shift to 
indexed securities which could have a significant economic impact. 
 
a) Effect on Savings. The availability of indexed bonds would offer 
savers increased certainty as to the real rate of return they would be 
able to obtain on their savings over specific periods of time. While 
this might be counted as a benefit in itself, it is by no means clear 
what effect it would have on the total level of savings. For some 
people it might make saving more attractive; others might feel they 
would need to save less, since they would no longer have to protect 
themselves against the contingency of a major reduction in their real 
wealth due to unanticipated inflation at some point in the future. It 
is also unclear whether the availability of indexed bonds would result 
in savers expecting higher or lower real returns. It would not be 
unreasonable to expect that, because of the removal of the inflation 
risk, somewhat lower real rates of return on indexed bonds would be 
acceptable to many lenders than the real return that they might in 
practice be able to earn on securities denominated in money terms. 
However, this could not be taken for granted. 
 
If unanticipated inflation did occur, the existence of 
indexed assets would mean that wealth would not be redistributed 
from the personal sector (net asset holders) to net debtors (the 
corporate sector and governments), which is what occurs when only 
money bonds are available. Again, however, there is no very strong 
'presumption as to the direction of the net effect on savings of 
such a redistribution of wealth. (8) One might conclude, therefore, 
that whatever the direction of the effect, indexation is unlikely 
to cause a major change in net savings in the economy. 
 
(8)Widespread adoption of indexed principal financial instruments, 
however, would cause a significant change in the appearance of the  
composition of savings as depicted in the National Accounts. Basically, 
the 'inflation component' of nominal interest, which is now recorded 
in different parts of the ledger as part of personal 
(interest) income, part of government expenditure, part of 
business expenses, and - to the extent it is reinvested - as 
part of personal savings, would be eliminated. 
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But the effect of indexation on the composition of savings 
appears to be more predictable and perhaps more significant. The 
availability of indexed bonds could be expected to reduce the relative 
attractiveness of assets such as consumer durables, objets d'art, 
inventories and real estate which have acquired a growing appeal in 
recent years as hedges against inflation. As a result, everything else 
being equal, the availability of indexed bonds would mean that a greater 
proportion of savings would be available for investment in financial 
assets; in particular, one would expect a greater willingness to channel 
savings into long-term debt instruments. 
 
 b) Effect on Investment. Indexed bonds could have some favourable and 
 
 some unfavourable effects on the allocation of investment. On the 
 
 favourable side, the issuance of indexed bonds by corporations, if it 
 
 were to come about, would likely reduce two tendencies towards distortion 
 
 in the allocation of business investment which otherwise exist when 
 
 either the inflationary outlook is uncertain and/or when a high continuing 
 
 rate of inflation and high nominal interest rates prevail. Firstly, in 
 
 the absence of indexed instruments, expectations about inflation forecasts 
 
 might be expected to have a significant influence on a firm's willingness 
 
 to invest, particularly in longer-term projects, when a substantial 
 
 part of the investment must be financed through borrowing. Everything 
 
 else being equal, the higher the rate of inflation a firm expects, the 
 
 more likely it is to judge a project to be profitable when financed 
 
 through issuing debt at a given nominal interest rate. There is little 
 
 reason to expect different firms' expectations about future rates of 
 
I . 
inflation to be correlated with the inherent real returns on their 
 
investment projects. Thus, in the absence of indexation, diverse 
 
 expectations about future rates of inflation will introduce an extraneous 
 
 factor (individual firms' expectations 2about inflation) into the allocation 
 
 of investment. The use of indexed bonds as a financing medium by 
 
 corporations would tend to reduce this extraneous factor. In particular, 
 
 the possibility of borrowing via indexed bonds might encourage investment 
 
 on the part of those with low inflationary expectations, i.e. those who 
 
 look upon current interest rates as incorporating a high real interest 
 
 cost.      
  
Indexed bonds might also alter the effect of inflation on the 
allocation of investment in a second way. In the absence of indexed 
bonds, the combination of a shift to higher levels of inflation and 
higher levels of nominal interest rates changes the time pattern of 
real debt service payments on a bond or mortgage. With inflation, real 
debt service payments in respect of repayment obligations with a fixed 
money interest rate are relatively high early in the life of the debt, 
and decline towards the end of the repayment period as the principal 
sum is amortized. The longer the life of the asset and the higher the 
rate of inflation, the stronger this effect will be. This basic point 
may be illustrated further with reference to a conventional mortgage  
where the debt service payments - interest plus principal amortization - 
are constant in current dollars over the life of the mortgage. Obviously, 
with inflation, a constant stream of payments in current dollars will have 
a value in real terms which declines (and the more rapidly so the higher 
the rate of inflation). If two payments streams under different 
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rates of inflation are to have the same present values - as is the case 
if nominal interest rates adjust fully for inflation - the one that 
declines faster in real terms (the higher inflation case) must start at 
higher levels in real (and nominal) terms and end at a lower level in 
real terms. Also, since a longer, maturity implies a greater decline 
from start to finish in the value of the real payments stream for any 
given rate of inflation, the longer the maturity, the larger will be 
the initial shift up (and the larger the shift down at maturity). 
 
Without indexed bonds, the 'tilting effect' of this time profile of 
real debt services charges(9) means that a shift to higher levels of 
inflation will result in more severe initial cash flow problems for long-
lived investment projects than for shorter-lived projects.  
Some relative discouragement of long-lived projects under the existing 
system might thus be expected. In other words, firms, confronted with 
the choice of two projects having the same expected real rate of return 
over their lifetimes, will choose the shorter-lived project in order to 
avoid the higher risks associated with the longer-lived project during 
the initial period of reduced relative cash flow. An indexed loan, 
however, would have a constant debt service stream in real terms. 
 
It can thus be argued that if the corporate sector were to 
follow the government's example in selling indexed bonds, the use of  
the indexed bonds by corporate borrowers would tend to avoid two potentially 
distorting effects on the allocation of corporate investment which  
otherwise tend to occur under inflationary conditions. But it is not 
possible to determine the quantitative significance of these distortions. 
On the other hand, the introduction of indexed bonds (by the 
federal government) could also have some adverse effects on private 
borrowers and private investment.. If some borrowers were to issue 
indexed bonds, it might well become more difficult for others to raise 
funds on an unindexed basis. If that were to be the case, this might  
have the effect of raising interest rates on unindexed debt and discouraging 
private investment. However, this need not be the case. If governments only 
substituted indexed debt for some of the non-indexed debt they· 
would otherwise have issued, there need not necessarily be any effect 
on the nominal interest rate which those wishing to borrow on an unindexed 
basis would need to pay. But even in this case, as the great majority  
of private borrowers would be reluctant to issue debt on an 
indexed basis, many private borrowers would believe themselves 
to be at a disadvantage in raising funds in the market relative 
to governments. The psychological effect alone might discourage 
these private borrowers from undertaking investment. 
 
(9)While the tilting effect is fully eliminated in the case of 
indexed principal bonds, since both interest payments and the 
redemption value are constant in real terms, it is less adequately 
dealt with in the case of principal compensation bonds. In the case 
of the latter, the bonds' current value will decline in real terms 
in an inflationary environment and, hence, the debt servicing 
schedule still contains a front-end load element. 
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Mortgage borrowers might be thought to be among those placed 
at a disadvantage if indexed debt became available from governments. 
But because of the generally long amortization periods associated with  
mortgages, mortgage borrowers are particularly vulnerable to the 
tilting of real payment streams under inflationary conditions 
already discussed. As a result, the indexation of mortgages could 
provide benefits to mortgage borrowers by reducing the initial 
real .debt servicing cost burden. 
 
c) Effect on Expectations and Other Economic Effects. Extension of 
indexing to federal government bonds might be taken as a further 
indication that the government viewed the problem of inflation as 
insoluble. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) put the traditional case against indexed government bonds on 
expectational grounds most strongly in a 1973 report entitled Indexation 
of Fixed Interest Securities. It stated that "a concern of governments 
must be to guard against the risks that recourse to indexation would be 
interpreted by public opinion as a sign that the authorities were less 
firm in their determination to bring inflation under control and that a 
widespread adoption of indexing would fuel inflation expectations". In 
recent years, however, the high rates of inflation experienced have 
increased somewhat the importance of the equity objectives achieved  
through indexing relative to the concerns that exist about its expectational 
impact. A group of independent experts chaired by Paul McCracken  
presented a report to the OECD in 1977 in which they commented 
rather favourably on the indexation of financial assets, even though 
they continued to express reservations about the desirability of 
wage indexation and escalators in price contracts. 
 
Indexing financial instruments would also have certain broad 
economic effects which parallel those resulting from the indexation of 
taxes, social security payments or wages. It would tend to reduce one 
source of 'automatic stabilization' in the economy to variations in 
demand-related inflation. For instance, at present, an increase in 
inflation causes a decline in real wealth and, thus, presumably a 
decline in real consumer spending. This reduction in real demand will 
tend to brake the increase in inflation, if it has its origins in 
excess demand. To the extent that a growing portion of total wealth 
would be held in the form of indexed bonds, the real value of which 
would not be affected by inflation, this stabilizing wealth effect on 
consumer spending would tend to diminish. 
 
To the extent that business relied on indexed debt instruments for 
financing, and to the extent that it was able to raise prices as costs 
rose, any increase in the rate of inflation would raise the debt servicing 
component of total operating costs and, thus, put further upward pressure 
on prices. Indexing could then become a potential source of cost-push 
inflationary pressure. This would be particularly troublesome when the 
inflation triggering the indexing resulted from a depreciation of the 
currency necessary to restore equilibrium in the current account of the 
balance of payments, as has been the situation in Canada in recent years. 
In that case, indexing would temper the ensuing change in relative prices 
and impede the process of adjustment. In 1967, following the devaluation of 
the markka, the Finnish government eliminated much of the indexing in its 
economy for that very reason. 
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On the other hand, by reducing the shifts in the distribution 
of wealth and income between borrowers and lenders which result from 
unexpected inflation, and by reducing any changes in the composition of 
demand which these income shifts entail, the indexing of financial 
instruments might well reduce one possible source of disturbance in the 
economy. Under the existing system, a demand management policy that is 
successful in reducing inflation tends to leave some borrowers stranded 
with previous high nominal interest rate commitments, which may create 
financial difficulties for those borrowers. The use of indexed bonds 
could lessen the financial difficulties corporate borrowers might. 
encounter during the transition from high to low rates of inflation and 
thereby facilitate the implementation and acceptance of anti-
inflationary monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
In summary, from the point of view of its effects on 
economic stability, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to the 
direction of the effect of indexation. It might impede adjustment if 
the economy experienced a shock to prices that was not created by 
excessive demand but by other causes such as a sharp increase in the 
cost of imported oil. At the same time, however, it might facilitate 
adjustment to lower rates of inflation achieved through conventional 
demand management methods. As was the case with savings and 
investment, the impact of indexing on economic stability would 
likely be least significant under Scenario 3. 
 
4. The Implications for Financial Markets. A key to the 
implications for the financial markets of the issuance of the 
Government of Canada indexed bonds relates to the effect they 
might have in inducing other borrowers to follow suit. The 
experience of other countries has shown that the introduction of 
indexed securities by a leading borrower does have some effect on 
other borrowers' willingness to market indexed securities. 
 
The impact of the issuance of indexed federal bonds on the 
financial system can be analyzed in terms of their effect on lenders 
and borrowers and would depend, to a large extent, on the proportion of  
overall demand for this type of security. If demand were large, exceeding 
that required for retirement income funding purposes, many debt issuers 
might eventually feel obliged to resort to this type of financing.  
This would likely lead to a greater variety of indexed investment 
instruments being developed so as to enable borrowers to remain 
competitive and the needs of lenders to be met. 
 
The relative attractiveness of indexed securities depends not 
only on the market's forecast with respect to inflation and real 
interest rates, but also on the degree of confidence the market has in 
this outlook. The choice the market faces is whether there is greater 
risk in its outlook on real interest rates or its outlook on inflation; 
another uncertainty relates to the volatility of possible changes in  
these outlooks. When the market has little confidence in its inflationary 
outlook, changes in which can be quite volatile, it would prefer an 
indexed bond to minimize the risk related to this uncertainty. Consequently, 
the case can be made that, for reasons of risk minimization, there will 
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always be some demand for indexed bonds. This demand would exist even 
in the absence of expectations of high and rising inflation rates and 
would be a function of the degree of uncertainty borrowers attached to 
their anticipated rate of inflation and to the volatility of that rate 
vis- à-vis anticipated real interest rates. 
 
On the assumption that there would likely be a substantial 
demand for indexed bonds, a key determinant of the impact on financial 
markets of the introduction of indexed bonds is obviously the extent to  
which they might be issued by borrowers other than the federal government. 
As noted earlier, however, it is uncertain what the reaction of other 
borrowers might be. The issuance of indexed bonds by the federal government 
could result in pension funds seeking to purchase more indexed federal 
bonds and fewer bonds of other borrowers. While such switching of financial 
flows could put pressure on other borrowers to compete through indexation 
of their own securities, this need not be the case, provided  
the government did not increase the overall demands on the market 
beyond that which would otherwise exist. In the former case, the 
increased purchase of indexed federal bonds by pension funds would mean 
that fewer federal bonds would need to be sold elsewhere. This, in 
turn, would leave funds available from lenders for those borrowers who 
had previously depended heavily on financing from pension funds. It  
is, thus, conceivable that the financial market adjustment to the issuance 
of indexed federal bonds could be limited to some switching in financial 
flows, without any overwhelming pressure for more widespread indexation  
of bonds by other issuers. On the other hand, the federal example with 
respect to the indexing of its bonds could induce a general shift 
towards indexation, in which case there would likely be less switching 
of capital flows. The indexation of securities would tend to spread, 
however, if borrowers who previously had depended heavily on pension  
funds as a major source of long-term financing found that it was 
necessary to issue indexed bonds of their own in order to attract 
the funds they required from other sources or, indeed, to compete 
for a share of funds from retirement savings. 
 
Under Scenario I (unlimited quantities of indexed federal bonds 
for eligible purchasers), the indexing of bonds would be most likely to 
spread to other issuers either because the latter sought to, protect 
their traditional financing sources or because they found that an 
indexed bond feature was essential to the development of alternate 
sources of long-term financing. Under Scenario 2 (limited quantities of 
indexed federal bonds to all comers), the risk of the spread of 
indexation might be somewhat lower in the first instance because there 
might not be the same pressure on borrowers to protect traditional 
funding sources. On the other hand - depending on investors' experience 
with indexed bonds - there might eventually develop greater pressure for 
more, and more widespread, indexing of all bonds. Under Scenario 3 
(limited quantities of indexed federal bonds to be available only to 
eligible purchasers), the risk of the spread of indexing is likely to be 
smallest and might well be a function of the extent of the limit on the 
supply of indexed federal bonds: the fewer issued, the less likely 
indexing would be to spread. 
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5. The Impact on Government Operations.  
 
a) Effect on the Conduct of Monetary Policy. The introduction of 
indexed bonds would influence the structure of the bond market - that 
is, the types and amounts of securities available - and the nature of 
those who issued and purchased securities. The extent to which the 
market structure changed would have considerable implications for the 
conduct of monetary policy because of the importance of open market   
operations (the buying and selling of federal securities) by the 
Bank of Canada as a means of implementing monetary policy. The 
success with which open market operations is conducted depends 
heavily on the nature of that capital market. 
 
From this perspective stems one argument against the unrestricted 
Scenario 1. This is the need to retain flexibility in the type of instrument 
available for trading in the market. The implementation of  
an effective monetary policy could be hampered if ownership of federal 
securities were unduly concentrated, particularly if it were concentrated in 
less actively traded accounts. If indexed federal government bonds were 
freely available to the pension system and if the private sector did not 
issue indexed securities on a significant scale, a substantial volume of 
pension funds might switch into federal government debt.  
Over time, pension funds could end up holding a large proportion of 
federal debt outstanding. In that case, the breadth and depth 
required in the market to absorb large transactions in federal 
bonds without causing excessive fluctuations in interest rates 
might be reduced. In this context, Scenarios 2 and 3, with their 
implied restraints on the supply of indexed bonds, would be easier 
from the point of view of the implementation of monetary policy. 
 
The Bank of Canada normally purchases some portion of new 
government debt issues for purposes of managing the money supply. If 
pension funds were allowed to acquire any amount of indexed federal 
debt they wished, they might not only force the federal government 
into the role of a financial intermediary in years when pension 
funds' demand for such debt was in excess of the amount needed to 
finance government operations, but they could also interfere with 
the central bank's management of the money supply. 
 
On the other hand, there are some observers who feel that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy might be enhanced by the existence of 
parallel markets for both indexed and non-indexed bonds. In their view, 
the monetary authorities, by operating in both segments of the market 
simultaneously, would be able to influence real interest rates as well 
as nominal interest rates, and would be able to provide clearer 
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signals to market participants. (10) Under Scenario 3, however, 
there would likely be a very thin market for indexed bonds, and 
very little trading; the potential for using indexed bonds as a 
monetary policy tool, as outlined here, would then be very small. 
 
In summary, it is difficult to be precise about the impact of 
the introduction of indexed bonds on the effectiveness of open market 
operations, and hence on monetary policy, as it has traditionally been 
implemented. It can be assumed, however, that except under Scenario 2, 
difficulties might arise for implementing monetary policy because of a 
likely reduction of the depth and diversity of the market for 
government securities. Parallel markets for indexed and non-indexed 
bonds, however, would not in themselves inhibit the government from 
implementing effective policy. They might even be helpful. 
 
b) Effect on Public Debt Charges. Two sorts of questions may be 
raised about the implications of indexed bonds for the cost of 
public debt charges to the government: 
 
a) how might one expect the interest costs of such bonds to 
compare, on average, with those of conventional bonds? and  
b) what are the risks of significant budgetary problems if the 
actual costs turn out very differently from expected costs  
(because inflation turns out differently from 
expectations at 'the time the bonds were issued)? 
 
With regard to the cost of borrowing through indexed bonds, a 
theoretical case can be made that the expected cost to the government 
should be lower for indexed than money bonds. This assumes that bond 
buyers would be willing to accept a lower real rate of interest than 
the real rate which they expect on a money bond, in return for the 
elimination of the 'inflation risk'. Of course, if both investors and  
governments under-estimated future rates of inflation, as they appear to 
have done fairly consistently during the last two decades, the cost to 
 
(lO)For instance, in a market confined to the trading of money bonds, 
an increase in interest rates resulting from open market sales might  
be misinterpreted as reflecting an increase in inflationary expectations. 
Hence, it could fail to curtail the rate of growth in spending. In 
contrast, an increase in the real cost of borrowing caused by open 
market sales of indexed bonds would be less likely to be misinterpreted 
and more likely to reduce all types of spending, including investment. 
Furthermore, a sale of indexed bonds would tend to compress the yield 
differential between money and indexed bonds, would lower one possible 
indicator of inflationary expectations and could possibly have a 
psychological impact on inflationary expectations. Alternatively,  
the money authorities could attempt to reduce this differential, and 
lower inflationary expectations, by selling indexed bonds and buying 
money bonds, leaving the overall stance of monetary policy unchanged. 
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the government of using indexed bonds would be higher than the cost of 
using money bonds (since the actual cost of the money bond in real 
terms would turn out to be lower than the real rate interest coupon on 
the indexed bonds likely would have been). The reverse could also 
occur; if the government had greater confidence than the public in its 
ability to reduce the rate of inflation over time, the use of indexed 
bonds would appear very attractive from an expected cost point of 
view. Annex B seeks to quantify the magnitude of the possible cost 
fluctuations and to measure the risks involved. 
 
On balance, however, it could well be wrong to assume that the 
use of indexed bonds would lead to significant savings to the government 
on average public debt charges over any extended period of time. For such 
an assumption to be realized, a high degree of success in forecasting 
inflation would be required, and the experience of recent years raises 
questions about such an outcome. Use of indexed bonds would also increase 
the margin of uncertainty surrounding short-run forecasts of the dollar  
value of public debt payments, though this margin would still be relatively 
small in the case of the 'indexed principal' form of indexed bonds  
(where the compensation for the loss of real value is delayed until 
maturity, i.e. until some point well into the future). (ll) In 
general, the use of indexed principal bonds could be expected to 
increase the stability of public debt payments marginally in terms 
of Gross National Product (GNP), whereas if the principal 
compensation form of bond were used, stability in terms of GNP would 
decrease. Thus, if the government wished to maintain a relatively 
stable ratio of public debt charges to GNP, use of indexed principal 
bonds would be preferable to principal compensation bonds. 
 
c) Implications for Tax Policy. Before considering: the 
implications for tax policy, some clear limits must be placed on 
this aspect of the issue of indexed bonds. 
 
Firstly, there are direct implications for tax policy only if 
taxable entities are involved. Since neither registered pension funds 
nor the government are taxable, any system of bond indexing involving 
only these institutions is not directly relevant for tax policy. This 
means that the following discussion is largely limited to Scenario 2, 
where some of the indexed bonds are held outside pension funds, and to 
circumstances where taxable corporations issue indexed instruments. 
 
Secondly, even under Scenario 2, there are direct implications 
for tax policy only if special tax treatment is accorded to the inflation 
component of interest payments on the indexed bonds. Under Scenario 2, 
the government issues specific quantities of indexed bonds to the public 
at large. At present, with unindexed bonds, bond holders are not 
indifferent to the existence of inflation. Inflation increases nominal 
 
(ll)This is the case on a cash basis only. 
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rates of interest, but with progressive taxation, increases taxes 
proportionately more. The interaction of inflation and taxation has 
the effect of reducing the real income that bond holders would have 
earned from their investment in a non-inflationary environment, since 
tax is also paid on the inflationary portion of interest. 
 
Under a system of indexed bonds, taxation of the inflationary 
element of the investment return would be highly visible and would likely 
generate criticism. But the exemption from taxation of the explicitly 
inflationary component of interest payments on indexed bonds  
would also generate demands to exempt the implicitly inflationary component 
of interest payments on non-indexed bonds. In turn, this would raise wider 
questions about the way the entire income tax system handles inflation. 
Until such time as the structure of the tax system can be altered in a 
fundamental way to handle inflationary situations more  
fairly, tax policy considerations may be viewed as a substantial 
argument against Scenario/2. 
 
There is one further fact to consider. If indexed federal 
bonds were sold under Scenario 2 and a special exemption provided 
for the inflationary component of the interest income, that 
exemption would make the bonds of greater value to taxable entities 
than to non-taxable entities. In that case, pension funds might have 
trouble acquiring them in competition with other taxable investors. 
In any case, with taxable entities bidding for them, real returns 
might decline, making them of less interest to pension funds. 
 
6. Other Countries' Experience with Indexed Bonds. Indexation 
of financial assets has been tried at one time or another in a 
number of countries, including Finland, Israel, Sweden, Norway, 
France, Austria, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Brazil and 
Argentina. However, in only a few countries did the volume of 
indexed bonds outstanding at any one time ever reach a high 
proportion of the total volume of securities outstanding. 
 
In Finland, the indexing of long-term bonds was initiated 
immediately after World War 11 to avoid criticism from those who were 
being paid off in bonds for war-induced damage and losses. The index 
used was linked to wholesale prices. Initially, indexed bonds were 
issued only by the government, but over time financial institutions also 
became major issuers. Gradually indexing also spread to pensions and 
life insurance policies. During the late 1960s, indexing was abolished 
for everything but pensions and life insurance policies following an 
exchange crisis and currency devaluation. The government feared that the 
rapidly rising import prices would create an inflationary spiral via the 
various index linkages which would offset the benefits intended by the 
currency devaluation. 
 
  In Israel, the concept of indexed bonds was introduced in 1948 
(using an exchange  rate index) and was applied to government  bonds  in 
1957. Since 1957, indexation  has spread to many other economic and 
financial activities  and transactions. '  
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During the 1950s, when high rates of inflation prevailed 
in France, indexed instruments were popular and both public and 
private sector borrowers used them so extensively that up to one-
half of the total new bond volume was of an indexed nature. The 
indexing bases used varied widely and related to prices, 
productivity, gold, and stock exchange prices, to mention only a 
few. Early in the Fifth Republic (1958), indexation was outlawed. 
 
In Brazil, indexation was introduced in 1964 amidst conditions of 
runaway inflation. Ten years later, in 1974, government issuance of 
indexed bonds had to be temporarily suspended as accelerating inflation  
induced a wholesale shift towards indexed government bonds which 
threatened to dislocate the entire financial system. The index used 
in Brazil can be, and has been, altered from time to time so as to 
produce 'appropriate' results. Outside the government bond sector, 
indexing is of significance only in the area of housing finance. 
 
The experience of other countries with respect to the 
indexing of bonds may not be directly applicable to Canada. Most 
other countries which have used indexed securities have a greater 
measure of government control over interest rates and the allocation 
of credit than does Canada. Their experience may, therefore, be of 
limited relevance to the relatively unrestricted, sophisticated and 
competitive North American financial markets. 
 
Nevertheless, foreign experience  suggests that: 
 
- indexing  can be, and has been, tied to many bases; 
- parallel markets for indexed and non-indexed securities can 
exist side by side; 
- the possibility of a proliferation of indexation does exist. In 
Finland and Israel, indexing spread to bonds issued by 
almost every type of borrower, to bank deposits and bank 
loans, to pension and insurance benefits, and to many other 
types of financial assets as well as to wages and salaries; 
- indexing of financial instruments is not a panacea. An 
indexed system can produce undesirable feedbacks, 
particularly in countries which have a relatively open 
economy, where export prices can get out of line through 
the interaction of internal index-linkages; and 
- on balance, the failure of indexed bonds to spread, or to 
maintain themselves where j:hey were introduced, may well be 
indicative of their limitations as a policy instrument. 
 
C. Summary and Conclusions 
 
1. Summary.  
 
a) Unanticipated  inflation has a strong adverse  impact on the financing   
arrangements underlying defined benefit pension plans, even in their 
present largely non-indexed form, because of its disparate impact on 
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pension fund assets and liabilities. The introduction of indexed 
bonds has been suggested in some quarters as a means of helping 
to ensure that the current return on pension fund assets would 
more adequately reflect the current inflationary experience. 
 
b) The funding of retirement income constitutes a major source 
of new private financing in Canada's financial markets. By the 
end of 1976, total assets accumulated in this manner amounted to 
$39.5 billion, i.e. 12% of the total financial assets in Canada, 
while the $6.2 billion annual cash flow amounted to 20% of the 
total flow of savings in that same year. 
 
c) A federal initiative to issue indexed federal bonds might 
well be required as a quid pro quo if private employers were to 
be persuaded to index their pension plans, or if, in conjunction 
with the provinces, indexed pension plans were to be legislated. 
 
d) Three separate scenarios were identified involving the volume 
of indexed bonds issued by the federal government and the 
restrictions placed on the identity of the holders of such bonds. 
It appeared that the broad effect of the introduction of indexed 
bonds would be quite different under each approach, although with 
a considerable degree of uncertainty as to detailed effects. 
 
e) A great deal of uncertainty surrounds any analysis of the economic 
impact of the introduction of indexed bonds. The effect on total savings 
would likely be fairly insignificant. The introduction of indexed bonds 
could have some impact on the ability of the economy to adapt to changing 
circumstances (i.e. on its built-in stabilizing capability). It could add 
to cost-push inflation by making possible a more rapid transmittal   
of price increases through the economy. It could also increase demand-pull 
types of inflation because indexed bonds would eliminate the transfers of 
wealth from lenders to borrowers which currently tend to reduce the 
purchasing power of savers in an inflationary environment. If corporations 
were to issue indexed bonds, the potential exists for some favourable 
effects on the allocation of corporate investment. On the other hand,   
if corporations did not issue indexed bonds, they might become 
less competitive in the long-term .bond market, in which case 
the future growth of the economy could be impaired.  
 
f) The effect of the introduction of indexed bonds on Canadian capital 
markets is also far from certain. In other countries where indexed bonds 
have been experimented with, they appear to have failed, by and  
 
large, to achieve  a permanent  place  in the overall  capital market  structure.  
 
g) The effect on government  operations  is only marginally  clearer than   
the effect on the economy. The impact on government debt servicing costs 
would likely be small. While in theory it should be cheaper to borrow 
through indexed bonds because of the removal of the inflationary 
risk premium which is now part of the overall returns required by lenders, in 
practice the opposite might well be true if future inflation continued 
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to be under-estimated. The effect on the market for government securities, 
and hence on the implementation of monetary policy, under Scenarios 1  
and 3, would not be favourable, while Scenario 2 raises problems 
of tax policy. 
h) The current demand for indexed bonds by retirement income funds 
alone could be in the range of $5 billion annually during an initial 
five-year period. The main source of indexed bonds would almost 
inevitably have to be the federal and provincial governments, which 
might be able to divert, within their current borrowing programs, as 
much as $3 billion to indexed bonds, an amount that could be easily 
absorbed by the market with appropriate pricing. The several years 
ahead are perhaps an ideal time to introduce indexed bonds because 
the cash requirements of the federal government appear likely to be 
abnormally high by historical standards. 
 
i) Finally, it must be noted that although the overall analysis suggests 
that from a broad economic and financial perspective indexed bonds might 
have as many advantages as disadvantages, the analysis is very 
tentative. There appears to be a good deal of scope for things to go 
wrong, the risk of which needs to be balanced against the various 
alternatives facing the government relating to retirement income policy. 
 
2. Conclusions. 
 
a) Indexed federal bonds by themselves should not be expected to make 
possible the indexing of the private pension system; the amount of 
bonds that would likely be required would be too large for the federal 
government alone or in conjunction with the provinces, to supply. They 
could, however, perhaps be of some use in any package of measures 
designed to enhance the feasibility of indexed private pension plans.  
 
b) Of the three possible scenarios identified, Scenario 1, which assumes 
that unlimited amounts of indexed federal bonds would be issued to all 
those who wanted them for retirement income funding purposes, would be 
best suited to the needs of pension funds. However, it might require   
the federal government to act as a major financial intermediary; 
it might also interfere with the conduct of monetary policy by 
narrowing the market for Government of Canada securities. Because 
of this, and because of its likely unsettling effect on the 
Canadian capital markets, it would have to be rejected. 
 
c) Scenario 2, which limits the volume of indexed federal bonds to be 
issued, but places no restrictions on who might hold them, would be less 
effective in helping pension funds to index. Pension funds would face 
competition for the acquisition of a smaller volume of indexed bonds 
than under Scenario 1, particularly if the tax system were changed to 
provide more equitable treatment for purely inflationary returns. 
Therefore, Scenario 2 is not likely to be effective. 
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d) Scenario 3, which limits both the supply of indexed federal 
bonds and the right to hold indexed federal bonds, would be more 
useful to pension funds than Scenario 2. Any meaningful restriction 
on the supply, however, might drive up the price of indexed bonds 
and reduce their real returns. Such a scenario would thus have some 
value - but only limited value - in helping to persuade the private 
sector to accept an indexed pension system. 
 
e) If other bond issuers were involved in the issuance of indexed bonds, 
there would be some advantages. The issuers would share the burden of 
risk of greater than expected interest payments. Any increase in the 
supply and the diversity of indexed bonds available might help to better 
meet the needs of pension funds. On the other hand, a loss of control by 
the federal government as to who might hold indexed bonds, would likely 
cause holdings to spread beyond the pension funds, and thus would bring 
the difficulties associated with taxation front and centre. 
Unfortunately, if only for technical reasons, these tax difficulties are 
not easily solved. There would still be no assurance that the total 
supply of indexed bonds would be anywhere close to what pension funds 
might need, unless the federal government were prepared to accept, 
regardless of its own financing requirements, a role as the supplier of 
last resort of indexed securities. 
 
f) Therefore, since under any of the three scenarios identified 
the advantages of issuing indexed federal bonds appear to be 
offset by the disadvantages of doing so, it is doubtful that a 
federal initiative to issue indexed bonds could by itself be 
expected to solve the indexed pension issue. 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX A 
 
THE SUPPLY OF, AND DEMAND FOR, INDEXED BONDS 
 
 
A. The Demand for Indexed Bonds 
 
In Scenario 1 eligible holders of indexed federal bonds are 
limited to institutions administering pension and retirement saving 
programs, namely trusteed pension funds, insurance companies with respect 
to their annuities' and segregated funds' operations, and all financial 
intermediaries with respect to Registered Retirement Savings Plans 
(RRSPs). The total asset base and current cash flow involved in these 
activities in 1976 was $39.5 billion and $6.2 billion respectively. 
 
To quantify what proportion of these outstanding holdings might 
be converted into indexed bonds, and how much of this annual cash flow 
might be invested in indexed bonds, the pension fund sector was divided, 
somewhat arbitrarily into three separate components, each of which might 
react differently to the availability of indexed bonds. Firstly, there 
are the small pension funds (with assets of less than $1 million). 
Secondly, there is a group of public sector funded plans comprising 
federal and provincial Crown corporations, boards and commissioners, 
civil services of five provinces, and municipalities and municipal 
agencies (but excluding teachers' federations, educational institutions 
and health organizations). This group is already exposed to an indexing 
risk and generally more restricted in its investment powers than the 
'average' funded plan. Finally, there is the residual of all other 
plans. 
 
Small funds generally have had a poor investment performance. 
During the last decade during, they tended to be heavily committed to 
mutual funds and pooled funds typically operated by large institutions. 
Investment managers do not actively seek these accounts because the 
potential remuneration is not commensurate with the work involved. 
Therefore, small funds are left with the choice of continuing to invest  
through trust and insurance companies or to administer their own arrangements 
(via a trustee). With the availability of indexed bonds, one might  
expect that most, if not all, existing assets and new cash flows of 
small funds would be channelled into those instruments. 
 
In recent years there has been a tendency among pension funds to 
move into quasi-indexed assets, e.g. liquid instruments and mortgages. This 
appears to reflect in large part the realization that the rates of return on 
these short- and medium-term assets are more elastic vis- à-vis inflation 
than the rates on other investment instruments. To the extent that liquid 
assets were used as quasi-indexed instruments, much of the future demand for 
indexed bonds among all other pension funds might well, therefore, arise 
from a reduction in such assets. Since, however, 
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public sector funds did not follow the general trend towards a 
historically high ratio of liquid assets, relatively less demand for 
indexed securities could be expected from the substitution by public 
sector funds of indexed securities for liquid assets. 
 
Among all other funds, the ratio of liquid to total assets 
reached a peak in the 10% range by the end of 1974, a much higher ratio 
than that of previous years. This also suggests the existence of a 
significant demand for indexed bonds. In addition, the magnitude of 
their bond holdings is such as to warrant the expectation that some 
displacement by indexed bonds would take place. 
 
The potential demand among trusteed pension funds for indexed 
bonds, disregarding the effect of the actual real rate at which these 
bonds might be offered, might therefore conceivably evolve as follows.  
Note that the numbers that follow, while they have some element of logic 
in them, are by~no means projections. They are simply assumptions. 
They are intended only to provide an initial 'ballpark' estimate 
of the demand for indexed bonds. 
 
Trusteed Pension Funds Asset Basis Cash 
Flow 
Basis 
   $ billions $ millions 
1. Small Funds     
60% of assets  (including liquid 0.3   
assets, pooled funds and bonds)    
100% of cash flow   67/p.a. 
 
2. Public Sector Funds Excluding , 
Health and Education  
nil of liquid assets or pooled funds 
1.9 
 
40% of bond portfolio 
 
50% of cash flow 660/p.a. 
  
3. All Other Funds 
 
50% of liquid assets 0.6 
60% of pooled funds 0.8 
40% of bond portfolio 2.8 
50% of cash flow 940/p.a. 
Total    1,857/p.a. 
 
With regard to the annuities aspects of the insurance business, 
over half the assets involved were already invested in quasi-indexed 
instruments (mortgages and liquid assets) with almost the entire balance 
being held in the form of fixed income securities. This would appear to 
suggest that the annuities business might possibly constitute a substantial 
source of demand for indexed bonds from liquid asset replacement: 
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Insurance Cos.-Annuities Asset Basis Cash Flow Basis 
 
    $  billions $ millions 
 
Excludes  amounts covered under trusteed   
 
plans and RRSPs   
 
40% of bond portfolio 0.7  
 
50% of liquid assets 0.2 
400/p.a. 
 
100% of cash flow  
 
Total   0.9 400/p.a. 
 
 
In the segregated funds' operations, the insurance companies 
displayed quite a different strategy; while bonds, mortgages and 
liquid assets account for a relatively insignificant share, over half 
the assets of segregated funds were held in the form of equities. The 
resulting demand for indexed b~nds might be as follows: 
 
Insurance Cos.-Segregated  Funds Asset Basis Cash Flow Basis 
 
(excludes amounts covered under trusteed $  billions $ millions 
 
plans and RRSPs)    
 
25% of bond portfolio 0.1    
 
50% of liquid assets 0.1   
 
25% of cash flow 
0.2 
 lO5/p.a. 
 
Total   105/p.a. 
 
 
Finally, one of the remarkable features of RRSPs is their 
very high proportion of liquid assets, presumably including a large 
number of Guaranteed Income Certificates (GICs) of the trust 
companies which administer many RRSPs. Since it is unlikely that the 
trust companies would willingly surrender funds already held in this 
form, and since most of these assets are in the form of fixed-term 
deposits, the likely proportion of these assets to be converted into 
indexed bonds in the first instance might not be very great: 
 
RRSPs   Asset Basis Cash Flow Basis 
 
    $ billions $ millions 
 
25% of bond portfolio 0.3  
 
35% of liquid assets 1.1  
 
40% of cash flow 
1.4 
670/p.a. 
 
Total   670/p.a. 
 
 
The foregoing data may be summed as follows: 
 
Grand Total Asset Basis Cash Flow Basis 
 $ billions $ millions 
Amount 8.9  3,032 
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In summary, these numbers seem to suggest a demand for indexed 
bonds from the conversion of existing assets equal to around $9 billion 
and $3 billion from current cash flow. For reasons outlined earlier, 
fund managers might find it difficult to quickly convert the desired 
proportion of their existing asset base into indexed bonds. Assuming, 
therefore, that such conversions were to be phased in over a five year 
period, this would result in an annual conversion rate of $1.8 billion. 
Thus, on the basis of the above calculations the total initial five-  
year demand for indexed bonds might be estimated to be in the $4.8 
billion range annually. 
 
Note that these calculations were done in respect of 1976. 
Updating this tentative analysis in terms of current demand is difficult, 
as some of the basic data are not available. However, it is known that 
the assets of trusteed pension funds grew by nearly 40% and cash flow by 
perhaps 50%, between the end of 1976 and the end of 1978. On the other 
hand, with the improved stock and bond market performance, the temptation 
to switch to indexed bonds might not have increased at the same rate.  
As a very rough estimate, therefore, 1978 demand in the range of $5 
billion annually might not be too far wrong. 
 
One further point might be noted. If, in fact, it were to take 
five years to convert the desired level of the existing stock of non-
indexed pension fund assets into indexed assets, the demand for indexed 
bonds would subsequently decline (in constant dollar terms) subject to 
further growth of the system. The $4.8 billion 1976 demand would fall to 
$3 billion; or in 1978 terms, the $5 billion might decline to roughly 
$3.2 billion annually. Note further that a conversion within five years 
might well be practical in the sense that government cash requirements 
look like they will be very large by historical standards in the several 
years ahead, so that the capacity to supply abnormally large volumes of  
bonds (in this case indexed bonds) is perhaps within the realm of possibility. 
 
It cannot be stressed sufficiently, however, how tentative these 
numbers are. They should be taken only as an extremely subjective 
estimate of possible demand levels for indexed bonds for retirement 
income funding purposes, if the supply were available to meet it. 
 
B. The Supply of Indexed Bonds 
 
To determine the amount of indexed bonds the federal 
government might be able to supply, a review has been made of federal 
financing requirements over the last decade. There are four main 
sources of borrowing: Treasury Bills (TBs), Canada Savings Bonds 
(CSBs), marketable bonds and government employee pension plans. Of 
these, it has been assumed that the latter must be left out of the 
calculations entirely. Furthermore, as was the case for the demand 
analysis, price considerations were not taken into account. 
 
It has been assumed that a significant proportion, i.e. 30% of 
CSBs might be diverted into indexed bonds. This in part reflects the fact 
that, on a few occasions in the last decade, the government has sold very 
large quantities of CSBs to assist its tight cash requirement 
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position (in particular in 1971, 1974 and 1975). A significant portion 
of those cash requirements might have been met by loans from pension 
funds. (1) Moreover, there is no overriding need to meet CSB demand at 
historical levels, though presumably the government would have an interest 
in keeping that market alive and well, having developed it over the  
years. In any event, the 30% figure might be lower than is 
feasible, resulting in a downward bias to the results. 
 
With respect to TBs, only a 10% conversion is assumed, as it 
is arguable that the requirements of monetary policy would impose a 
substantial constraint on the monetary authorities with regard to the 
volume of TBs that could be replaced. 
 
As for marketable bonds, a 30% switch to indexed bonds is 
assumed. Anything beyond that figure might mean that the government 
would endanger the continuance of a sufficiently diversified market 
for its securities. And even 30% might be considered a bit on the 
high side, introducing an upward bias to the results. 
 
Note that the assumptions for TBs, and more particularly for 
marketable bonds, might not be readily achievable. For example, during the 
ten years from 1967 to 1976, almost all net new bonds and bills were taken 
up by the banking system (or non-residents). While this situation has 
altered in the last couple of years, it is arguable that, for the period as 
a whole, central bank requirements for bonds and bills, related both to 
money supply expansion and the conduct of open market operations, and 
chartered bank requirements for bonds and bills for liquidity purposes; 
would have made the 30% and 10% assumptions unrealistic. It is assumed 
here, however, that if indexed bonds had existed, monetary policy might 
have been implemented in a somewhat different manner "and the banking 
system could have adjusted its modus operandi to get along with fewer 
federal securities. Although traditionally the chartered banks have looked 
upon federal securities as their preferred instrument for liquidity 
purposes, it might have been possible for the central bank to help  
develop an active market for other instruments, such as commercial 
paper, if as a result of the introduction of indexed federal bonds 
the supply of marketable federal securities were to prove 
insufficient to meet the liquidity needs of the banking system. 
 
The estimate of demand for indexed bonds set out above was 
couched initially in terms of 1976 conditions. Therefore, the supply 
side is also examined initially in terms of that year. In 1976, net new 
CSBs sold were equal $0.8 billion. The net treasury bills issued in 1976 
were equal to $1.6 billion. This implied a potential supply of  
$0.4 billion (30% of $0.8 billion plus 10% of $1.6 billion). In addition, 
gross issues of marketable bonds were equal to $3.95 billion (excluding 
CSBs and TBs), of which 30% or $1.2 billion might have been indexed bonds. 
Thus, in that year, about $1.6 billion in indexed federal bonds  
might have been made available.  Gross figures are used for other marketable 
 
(l)It may be significant in this context that since 1974, when the 
federal government re-entered the long bond market after several 
years absence, pension funds have been adding to their Canada 
bond holdings in a substantial way. 
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bonds since there is no reason not to include rollovers of that type 
of security as a potential source of supply. (2) Net figures have 
been used for TBs and CSBs, since TBs may be rolled several times 
annually, and since CSBs, owing to their encashability feature, may 
also be rolled over. However, assuming most CSBs are not rolled over, 
using net figures introduces a downward bias to the potential supply. 
 
In 1976, the provinces had gross new issues of $5.4 billion 
in Canadian dollar bonds. Eliminating about $1.9 billion for Canada 
Pension Plan (CPP) and Quebec Pension Plan (QPP),(3) $3.5 billion was 
sold in Canadian dollar bonds. Assuming that 30% might have been sold 
to pension funds as indexed bonds, about $1.0 billion of indexed 
bonds might have been supplied by the provinces in that year. 
 
Thus, looking at the federal and provincial governments together, if 
our estimate is based on 1976 alone, a $2.6 billion supply might have been 
feasible ($1.6 billion federal and $1.0 billion provincial). 
 
One question is whether the 1976 results were in some way 
atypical and, therefore, whether $2.6 billion would be an appropriate 
estimate to use. An alternative perspective is provided by looking at 
1972-1976 in aggregate. In that period, annual net new CSB sales 
averaged around $1.3 billion. New TBs issued averaged $0.8 billion 
annually. Using the same proportions as earlier for converting CSBs and 
TBs to indexed bonds, $0.5 billion rather than $0.4 billion might  
become  available  from the diversion  of CSBs and TBs into indexed bonds. 
 
Gross issues of other federal bonds averaged $2.5 billion 
annually over the same five years, which might have permitted $0.8 
billion annually in indexed bonds. Fr~m this alternative 
perspective, i.e. looking at 1972-1976 in aggregate, $1.3 billion 
annually, rather than $1.6 billion, might be the safer estimate. 
 
For the 1972-1976 period, gross sales of provincial bonds 
denominated in Canadian dollars, excluding CPP and QPP, equalled $2.3 billion 
annually. Of that amount, 30% equals $0.7 billion. Thus, if a five-year 
perspective is used, $2 billion annually might be more appropriate ($1.3 
billion federal and $0.7 billion provincial) than $2.6 billion. 
 
The estimate of supply available in 1978 could have been much 
higher than this $2 billion due to the exceptional federal cash require-
ments. Indeed, in that year, it could perhaps have been in the $3-4 
billion range. This goes some distance towards meeting the estimated $5 
billion demand in that year. Given the likely cash needs of governments 
during the next several years, the 1978 supply figure might well be more 
typical of what is possible during the next few years than the 1972-1976 
 
(2)Gross figures would be appropriate only until the first issues of 
indexed bonds mature after which net figures would be more appropriate.  
(3)Gross saving of social security funds was $2.2 billion. Of this, 
$1.5 billion was CPP money invested in provincial securities. Of 
$522 million in QPP funds, it is assumed that the Caisse de Depot 
et Placement invested $0.2 billion in Quebec bonds. 
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average. 
 
Thus, it is conceivable that federal and provincial 
governments might jointly be able to meet a substantial proportion, 
say, two-thirds of the possible demand for indexed bonds over the 
next several years without damaging in any significant way the depth 
and breadth of the market for their securities. It bears repeating, 
however, that a supply of this size appears to require some 
adjustments in the demand for federal securities on the part of the 
central bank and the chartered banks. 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that as governments 
gradually reduce their deficit position (whether it takes three, five or 
ten years) and hence their cash requirements, the potential supply of 
indexed bonds will be reduced. It is also the case that the demand for 
indexed bonds might in one sense begin to ease as the initial backlog of 
demand for such bonds would perhaps be satisfied after, say, five years. 
On the other hand, as noted earlier, the overall rate of growth in 
private retirement fund assets might increase relative to all financial 
assets. Thus, the possibility cannot be ruled out that after five years 
or so, the potential supply from governments would decline relative to 
the potential demand. 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX B 
 
THE IMPACT OF INDEXING ON PUBLIC DEBT CHARGES 
 
 
Indexed bonds give rise to two types 'of risks as regards 
public debt charges: the risk of the increased unpredictability of the 
dollar value of public debt payments in the short run, and the risk 
that, if inflation were to accelerate, such payments might become a 
serious burden on the budget. These issues will be considered in turn. 
 
The impact of the existence of indexed bonds on the short-run 
predictability (i.e. the predictability of expenditures in the fiscal year 
one year ahead) of government cash requirements for public debt servicing 
purposes(l) depends on the type of indexed bond which has been issued and 
the type of non-indexed debt instrument which it replaces. For a 'principal 
compensation bond', the margin of uncertainty for the following year's  
debt servicing payments is a function of the degree of uncertainty 
in the next year's inflation forecast and of the nominal value of 
the principal of, and the 'real' interest payment on, such bonds. 
For an 'indexed principal' bond, the margin of uncertainty in the 
next year's debt service charges depends on the uncertainty in the 
inflation forecast and on the real ,interest payment on all indexed 
bonds outstanding plus the value of bonds maturing that year. 
 
The point may be illustrated for a case in which there is an 
amount (B) of indexed bonds outstanding with a face value of $10 
billion, the 'real' interest rate (r) payable on these bonds is 2%, one-
tenth of the bonds mature each year, the forecast rate of inflation (i) 
is 5% with a margin of uncertainty eu) one year ahead of 2%. Cash 
payments on $10 billion of principal compensation bonds would equal the 
real interest on the entire amount, plus a sum to compensate lenders for 
the reduced real value of their bonds, plus the repayment of the 
principal on the fraction maturing. They can be calculated as follows: 
 
(l)The analysis is cast in terms of debt charge cash flow. Questions 
would arise concerning the accounting treatment of the 'inflation 
compensation' component of such payments, and concerning the 
accrual of liabilities for future inflation compensation payments 
on the principal of 'indexed principal' type bonds. The following 
discussion assumes that accrual of such liabilities would not be 
recorded as part of current expenditures. 
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= r(l +  i  ± u)B 
 
+ (i  ± u)B 
 
+ (1/10)x B 
 
= .02  (1 +  .05 ±.02) $10 bil.  
 
+ (.05 ± .02) $10 bil.  
 
+ (1/10) x $10 bil.  
 
 
= $1.71 bil. ± $.204 bil.  
 
i.e. the margin  of uncertainty is $204 million. 
 
Cash payments on $10 billion of indexed principal bonds 
would equal the real interest on the entire (indexed) amount, plus 
the repayment of the indexed principal on the fraction maturing: 
= r(l + i ±  u) B  
+ (1 +  i  ± u)  x   (1/10) x  B  
 
 
= .02(1 + .05 ±  .02) $10 bil.  
  + (1 + .05 ± .02) x $1 bil.  
 
= $1260 bil. ± $.024 bil.  
 
i.e. the margin  of uncertainty  is $24 million. (2) 
 
As an indication of the comparable margin of uncertainty on non-
indexed bonds, assume that there is a 2% point margin of uncertainty on 
the short-term (Treasury Bill) interest rate forecast, a 1% point margin 
of uncertainty on the long-term bond interest rate forecast, and that 
one-tenth of the stock of long-term marketable bonds mature each year. 
 
(2)In comparing this figure with the $204 million margin of uncertainty 
on principal compensation bonds, it should be kept in mind that in the  
case of indexed principal bonds the face value of the bonds outstanding 
either understates the amount actually owing to bond holders or alternat-
ively exceeds the face value at the time of issue depending on whether face 
value does or does not include inflation compensation accruals  
with respect to previous years. The two sets of results very 
specifically should not be taken as providing an insight into the 
relative borrowing costs of the two types of indexed bonds. 
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Then the margin of uncertainty on the cash payment on $10 billion of 
TBs would be $200 million, while the margin of uncertainty on 
payments on $10 billion of long-term bonds would be only $10 million. 
Since it has been assumed that indexed bonds would mainly displace 
long-term bonds, it appears that their use might lead to a greater 
margin of uncertainty in short-term debt payment forecasts, although 
this margin would still be relatively small in the case of indexed 
principal bonds. However, to the extent that indexed bonds displaced 
CSBs, the analysis would fall between the TB and long-term cases. 
 
The larger margin of uncertainty on the dollar value of public 
debt charges associated with indexed bonds would apply to medium-term as 
well as short-term forecasts. However, once the time horizon extends beyond 
the maturity date of bonds outstanding at the time of the forecast, it is 
not readily apparent whether indexed or non-indexed bonds give rise to the 
larger margin of uncertainty. The issue would turn on the relative 
predictability of nominal interest rates, inflation rates and real interest 
rates. Perhaps more important than predictability of the dollar value of 
debt charges, particularly in the medium-term, are the implications of 
indexation for debt charges relative to total expenditures, revenues or 
(GNP). With indexed principal bonds an acceleration of inflation would  
not be expected to lead to an increase in the short run in the ratio of 
debt charges to revenues from the existing tax structure or to GNP. (3) 
On the other hand, use of the principal compensation bond could give rise  
to greater short-run instability in the ratio of debt payments to revenues or 
GNP than at present because of the need to compensate bond holders in full 
for the loss in real value of their bond in the very year that loss occurs. 
Especially under a government policy of maintaining a relatively stable ratio 
of total expenditures to GNP, it would seem advantageous to minimize 
fluctuations in the ratio of public debt charges to GNP. Use  
of indexed principal bonds would thus be preferable to 
principal compensation bonds from this point of view. (4) 
 
(3)An exception to this generalization, which could be of some significance 
over periods of one or two years, would occur if the increase in the 
inflation index used to adjust bond payments resulted from price  
changes that occurred outside the economy and which were thus not associated 
with higher current dollar GNP and higher government revenues. Such would be 
the case, if the Consumer Price Index (CPI) were used as the index, and if 
some event or action caused a major increase in  
import prices. Indices which would be less likely to give 
rise to such a problem could be developed, but are not 
currently familiar to the public.  
(4)Given the tendency of nominal interest rates to increase with 
inflation, the same tendency for debt charges to increase relative to 
GNP, as inflation accelerates, exists for unindexed bonds  
if one considers a period long enough for the bonds to 
mature. However, as maturity of the existing stock is 
spread out, the increase relative to GNP is much more 
gradual for unindexed bonds than it would be for 
principal compensation indexed bonds. 
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